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  1. 紀要類・刊行物等
  2. 広島文化短期大学
  3. 広島文化短期大学紀要 第32巻

多重賃金を伴う不完全雇用均衡 (1)

https://doi.org/10.60171/00003198
https://doi.org/10.60171/00003198
2b75ea24-e3ad-4edb-9513-61fc6490ac16
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
32-1.pdf 32-1.pdf (329.9 kB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2023-03-15
タイトル
タイトル 多重賃金を伴う不完全雇用均衡 (1)
言語 ja
タイトル
タイトル Unemployment Equilibrium with Multiple Wages (1)
言語 en
言語
言語 jpn
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 不完全雇用均衡
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Unemployment equilibrium
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 ニューケインジアン
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 New Keynesian
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 効率賃金
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Efficiency Wage
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
資源タイプ departmental bulletin paper
ID登録
ID登録 10.60171/00003198
ID登録タイプ JaLC
著者 大槻, 智彦

× 大槻, 智彦

ja 大槻, 智彦

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Otsuki, Tomohiko

× Otsuki, Tomohiko

en Otsuki, Tomohiko

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抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 If all workers were identical, or if all firms were perfectly informed about the productivity of workers, and both firms and workers were risk neutral, a firm would respond to a fall in the value of a worker's output by cutting the worker's wage. If the value of the worker's marginal product were greater elsewhere (or if his utility from unemployment exceeded the wage), the worker would quit. However, if a firm is imperfectly informed about the productivity of its workers, the firm would care about which workers would be induced to quit by a wage cut. The firm most wants to retain - workers whose productivity exceeds their wage. In this article I have focused on how unobserved worker heterogenity can explain persistent of job queues - involuntary long term unemployment - and can cause a misallocation of workers between the industrial sector and the non - industrial sector or unemployment.
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 If all workers were identical, or if all firms were perfectly informed about the productivity of workers, and both firms and workers were risk neutral, a firm would respond to a fall in the value of a worker's output by cutting the worker's wage. If the value of the worker's marginal product were greater elsewhere (or if his utility from unemployment exceeded the wage), the worker would quit. However, if a firm is imperfectly informed about the productivity of its workers, the firm would care about which workers would be induced to quit by a wage cut. The firm most wants to retain - workers whose productivity exceeds their wage. In this article I have focused on how unobserved worker heterogenity can explain persistent of job queues - involuntary long term unemployment - and can cause a misallocation of workers between the industrial sector and the non - industrial sector or unemployment.
書誌情報 広島文化短期大学紀要

巻 32, p. 1-5, 発行日 1999-12-25
出版者
出版者 広島文化短期大学
ISSN
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 13483587
書誌レコードID
収録物識別子タイプ NCID
収録物識別子 AA11868325
フォーマット
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 application/pdf
著者版フラグ
出版タイプ VoR
出版タイプResource http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
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