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多重賃金を伴う不完全雇用均衡 (1)
https://doi.org/10.60171/00003198
https://doi.org/10.60171/000031982b75ea24-e3ad-4edb-9513-61fc6490ac16
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||||
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公開日 | 2023-03-15 | |||||||||
タイトル | ||||||||||
タイトル | 多重賃金を伴う不完全雇用均衡 (1) | |||||||||
言語 | ja | |||||||||
タイトル | ||||||||||
タイトル | Unemployment Equilibrium with Multiple Wages (1) | |||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||
言語 | ||||||||||
言語 | jpn | |||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
主題 | 不完全雇用均衡 | |||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
主題 | Unemployment equilibrium | |||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
主題 | ニューケインジアン | |||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
主題 | New Keynesian | |||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
主題 | 効率賃金 | |||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
主題 | Efficiency Wage | |||||||||
資源タイプ | ||||||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||
資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||||
ID登録 | ||||||||||
ID登録 | 10.60171/00003198 | |||||||||
ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||||||
著者 |
大槻, 智彦
× 大槻, 智彦
× Otsuki, Tomohiko
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抄録 | ||||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||
内容記述 | If all workers were identical, or if all firms were perfectly informed about the productivity of workers, and both firms and workers were risk neutral, a firm would respond to a fall in the value of a worker's output by cutting the worker's wage. If the value of the worker's marginal product were greater elsewhere (or if his utility from unemployment exceeded the wage), the worker would quit. However, if a firm is imperfectly informed about the productivity of its workers, the firm would care about which workers would be induced to quit by a wage cut. The firm most wants to retain - workers whose productivity exceeds their wage. In this article I have focused on how unobserved worker heterogenity can explain persistent of job queues - involuntary long term unemployment - and can cause a misallocation of workers between the industrial sector and the non - industrial sector or unemployment. | |||||||||
内容記述 | ||||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
内容記述 | If all workers were identical, or if all firms were perfectly informed about the productivity of workers, and both firms and workers were risk neutral, a firm would respond to a fall in the value of a worker's output by cutting the worker's wage. If the value of the worker's marginal product were greater elsewhere (or if his utility from unemployment exceeded the wage), the worker would quit. However, if a firm is imperfectly informed about the productivity of its workers, the firm would care about which workers would be induced to quit by a wage cut. The firm most wants to retain - workers whose productivity exceeds their wage. In this article I have focused on how unobserved worker heterogenity can explain persistent of job queues - involuntary long term unemployment - and can cause a misallocation of workers between the industrial sector and the non - industrial sector or unemployment. | |||||||||
書誌情報 |
広島文化短期大学紀要 巻 32, p. 1-5, 発行日 1999-12-25 |
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出版者 | ||||||||||
出版者 | 広島文化短期大学 | |||||||||
ISSN | ||||||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||||||
収録物識別子 | 13483587 | |||||||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||||
収録物識別子 | AA11868325 | |||||||||
フォーマット | ||||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |